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Abstract
This project assesses how xenophobia within a population 
translates to support for parties of the extreme right in 
Western Europe.  Extreme right parties have experienced 
a dramatic rise in support at the polls with both the promi-
nence of post-material values in voter decision-making and 
the party dealignment.  They represent Western Europe at 
its most volatile: the extreme right echoes salient concerns 
about a stagnating economy and increasing multicultural-
ism.  The party family staunchly opposes immigrants and 
minorities, blaming them for much of Europe’s domestic 
strife.  Extreme right rhetoric is wrought with xenophobic 
sentiment.  How does the key attitudinal variable of xeno-
phobia affect voter support for parties of the extreme right 
on the macro-level?  Using data from Eurobarometer 53, a 
survey posing questions regarding Western European citi-
zens’ attitudes, and controlling for other variables postulat-
ed in the literature to be affecters to support for the extreme 
right, we quantitatively assess the relationship between xe-
nophobia and vote share for parties of the extreme right in 
Western European democracies.  Although not as powerful 
an affecter as immigration, xenophobia is demonstrated to 
be an important causal determinant to voter support for 
parties of the extreme right.  
Why Model Voter Support for Parties of the Ex-
treme Right?
  The world is getting smaller.  The forces of globalization 
have increased the scale and scope of communication, com-
merce and cultural outreach.  Modern day advances allow 
farmers in France to sell their gourmet cheeses to cosmopolitan 
Chinese; a car manufactured in Idaho by a Japanese automaker 
is shipped overnight to its buyer in Germany.  Such feats in 
commerce and subsequent meshing of cultures could only have 
been imagined by businessman and international connoisseurs 
in the past. 
  In Europe, the growth of the European Union has allowed 
free movement of goods, capital, and people between the bor-
ders of the continent.  More importantly, globalization has fa-
cilitated the flow of international immigrants across Europe’s 
collective border.  Such freedom of mobility represents the 
greatest hopes of some, and the worst fears of others.  Immi-
grants from West and North Africa and Asia continue to emi-
grate northward by the boatload to Europe in search of better 
political and economic lives for themselves and their posterity. 
European countries, immobilized by stagnant economies, an 
aging population, and a relatively volatile political climate,
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have responded with mixed emotions to their new, darker-
skinned and culturally-conspicuous neighbors.  In all, Europe 
has reluctantly accepted its newcomers.  However, immigrant 
birth-rates far outweigh those of the indigenous, and first-gen-
eration European-born children of immigrants are caught be-
tween their traditional cultures and those of Europe; cultural 
friction increasingly characterizes the situation.  Riots by cul-
turally-estranged and economically-handcuffed French-born 
Arab youth in the fall of 2005 serve as a blood-curdling re-
minder of what could be in store for Europe in the future. 
  Most interesting is the effect that immigration has had on 
European politics.  Parliamentary systems in Europe allow re-
searchers to quantitatively study the effects that this looming 
culture clash has had on European voting tendencies.  Europe 
has in no doubt been affected; the recent popularity of parties 
representing the extreme right has polarized many across the 
continent.  In the last two decades alone, many such parties 
have tripled their vote shares. 
  These parties represent European politics at its most vola-
tile.  Led by the Front National in France, they advocate an 
anti-system, populist brand of politics and voice a rather salient 
discontentment with the political status quo in Europe.  More 
importantly, however, these parties voice a staunch resistance 
to immigration and multiculturalism.  Many of the parties of 
the extreme right flaunt outright xenophobia and cultural ex-
tremism.
  Europe’s strongest parties of the extreme right are the afore-
mentioned Front National in France, the National Alliance and 
the Northern League in Italy, the Flemish block in Belgium, 
and Austria’s Freedom Party which has even broken into gov-
ernment coalitions in the past.  Although many of these par-
ties have not had sufficient electoral success to warrant them 
considerable policy sway, many have had important affects on 
national political campaigns due in large part to their ability to 
set the topic of discussion and force other parties to recognize 
their most salient and controversial issues and establish posi-
tions on them.2 
  As in any democratic system, the rise of the extreme right 
in Europe can be fundamentally attributed to party popularity 
at the polls; these parties have mobilized to their present state 
because they attract voters.  Therefore, understanding the fac-
tors behind voter support for parties of the extreme right in Eu-
rope is crucial to understanding this party family and its future. 
Deeper understanding will allow for more in depth analysis of 
the cultural friction behind much of Europe’s domestic unrest, 
as well as shed light on the potential strength and scope of such 
cultural turmoil in the future.  Perhaps more importantly, un-
Research Paper
2
derstanding voter support for the extreme right might allow re-
searchers to anticipate extreme right policy preferences as such 
parties grab power within the framework of Europe’s democra-
cies.  In this manner, understanding voter support for the ex-
treme right will allow for better overall characterization of the 
party family itself in the context of an evolving Europe.
 
What is the Relationship Between Xenophobia 
and Support for the Extreme Right?
  This project seeks to understand voter support for parties of 
the extreme right on the unit of the European population.  We 
will explore the connection between voter attitudes and support 
for parties of the extreme right.  Voter attitudes are factors other 
than political and economic outlook that likewise shape voter 
trends and issue-positions.  Where past research has focused 
on the effects of ideological (left/right) proximity and immi-
gration, as well as the effects of protest voting on support for 
parties of the extreme right, we consider the effects of the fun-
damental attitudinal variable xenophobia in the macro-level.3 
In the scope of this project, xenophobia is defined as discom-
fort with people of other races and/or religions.  Because many 
parties of the extreme right preach anti-immigration and anti-
multiculturalism to an extent that is often outright xenophobic, 
xenophobic sentiments are doubtlessly an attitude that might 
shape voter support for these parties. 
  What is the effect of xenophobic tendencies in a population 
on support for parties of the extreme right?  This is the funda-
mental question posed and answered here.  The ramifications 
of such a question are many.  By understanding the salience of 
xenophobia in voter decision-making, one can then consider 
the social circumstances affecting voter attitudes, understand 
the way these attitudes manifest themselves in the political 
schema, and forecast the future of parties of the extreme right 
in the context of a volatile Europe. 
Literature Reviewed
  Parties of the extreme right have been a popular subject 
of study among political scientists, psychologists, and sociolo-
gists alike because they do not lend themselves to the mould 
of the classical political party.  They are especially interesting 
when considering voter behavior.  Researchers have considered 
methodological issues such as tabulating support for the ex-
treme right, and independently assessing the salience of insti-
tutional, economic, and attitudinal factors influencing extreme 
right support.  Still others have used comparative means to as-
sess the factors that contribute to individual extreme right party 
success and failure.
  Golder provides a groundbreaking model for support of 
the extreme right.  He considers various causative variables 
to an individual party’s relative success at the polls.  His work 
is based on three main hypotheses.  The Materialist hypothesis 
argues that unemployment increases support for parties of the 
extreme right only when immigration is high.  The Institutional 
hypothesis argues that more permissive electoral systems func-
tion to increase the vote share of the extreme right.  Finally, the 
Ideational hypothesis argues that high immigration increases 
support for the extreme right regardless of other factors.  His 
data affirms both the Institutional and the Ideational hypotheses 
finding both variables of electoral permissiveness as well as 
immigration to be significant positive affecters to vote share. 
Golder establishes a framework for understanding the econom-
ic and political factors that benefit parties of the extreme right 
in the context of European democracies.  More importantly to 
this project, he provides a valuable set of controls that must be 
considered when attempting to quantitatively gauge support for 
parties of the extreme right using other external variables, such 
as xenophobia. 
  Norris also analyzes the rise of the radical right.5  She ar-
gues that voter support for this party family is a product of a 
complex synthesis of voter attitudes, party processes, and polit-
ical structures.  She downplays the importance of immigration 
rates and economic stability.  On a macro-level, Norris argues 
against the value of attitudinal variables in predicting support 
for extreme right parties.
Radical right parties can gain ground in societies 
where attitudes toward ethnic minorities remain rela-
tively liberal and tolerant, such as Norway, as well as 
faring poorly elsewhere in countries where the public 
proves more hostile toward outsiders...5 (p. 67)
 However, the analyst does support the value of attitudinal 
variables in predicting support for the extreme right on the 
level of individual voters.  Mainly, she argues that cultural pro-
tectionism, or the desire on the part of the individual to miti-
gate the effects of external cultural influences on his society, is 
the fundamental attitudinal cause for support for parties of the 
extreme right.5  In the context of Golder’s work, Norris rejects 
the Materialist and Ideational hypotheses and accepts the Insti-
tutional hypothesis on the macro-level.
  Van der Brug et al. argue that voter support for parties of 
the extreme right is based mainly in ideological (left/right) 
proximity, anti-immigrant stance, and relative party strength; 
they illustrate that such votes are not protest votes as is largely 
assumed.3  Their study of the 99 European elections in seven 
electoral systems shows that voter support for parties of the 
extreme-right is no less based on rational choice than is support 
for mainstream parties.  The researchers provide evidence that 
support bases of parties of the extreme right can be discussed in 
the same vain as those of other, more mainstream parties.3
 The work of Van der Brug et al. is important because it im-
plicitly argues that the political and economic outlook in a par-
ticular country has a large impact on voter support for parties of 
the extreme right.  If voters vote based on rational judgment of 
policy preferences, then it is likely that their opinions on poli-
cies change with the political and economic situation in their 
particular country.  This might indicate that the recent increase 
in support for parties of the extreme right at the polls is more a 
product of Europe’s increasing political volatility and deepen-
ing economic stagnation rather than variables concerned with 
voter attitudes toward people of different races and/or religions. 
This framework directly contradicts Norris’s analysis, which 
downplays economic and political variables in the macro-level, 
while supporting Golder’s Materialist hypothesis.
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  Fetzer’s work on voter support bases for anti-immigrant 
and/or nativist parties focuses on voter economic self-interest 
and cultural marginality as explanations for support for these 
parties.6  He argues that sociological and psychological models 
for voter behavior do not mesh sensibly with anti-immigration 
party policy preferences and methodology.  Using survey data 
and multivariate analyses focusing on France, Germany and the 
United States, he assesses the strength of economic self-interest 
and cultural marginality as affecters to voter support for anti-
immigrant parties.  His findings indicate that although economic 
self-interest is at best a “luke-warm” predictor to voter support 
for the extreme right, cultural marginality is a strong predictor; 
the more culturally marginalized a voter feels, the less likely 
s/he is to vote for an anti-immigration/nativist party.6 
  Cultural marginality can be understood as an inverse of 
Norris’s variable of cultural protectionism: majority cultures, 
those that are not culturally marginal, show cultural protection-
ism.  In this sense, because Fetzer argues that cultural margin-
ality is an inverse predictor to an individual voter’s propensity 
to vote for the extreme right, and because Norris argues that 
cultural protectionism directly influences an individual’s vote 
toward the extreme right, Norris and Fetzer implicitly agree on 
an important micro-level attitudinal cause to voter support for 
parties of the extreme right.
  Fetzer’s work also discusses the Allport-Pettigrew Contact 
hypothesis, which stipulates that contact can improve the over-
all relationship between natives and immigrants when this con-
tact is meaningful and cooperative.  However, when contact is 
casual, it tends to increase xenophobia on the part of the native, 
further isolating immigrants.  He applies this theory to both 
Germany and France and discusses both cases.7
  Schain discusses the tactics of the Front National in achiev-
ing surprising success in the 997 parliamentary elections 
in France.2  He attributes their success to three fundamental 
capacities. First, the party was able to unite voters on previ-
ously opposite sides of the political spectrum; it mobilized the 
working class by capitalizing on fears that immigrants had, and 
would continue to stifle the French unskilled labor market.  At 
the same time the party maintained its more traditional right 
wing ultra-conservative support.  He also discusses the Front 
National’s masterful use of French labor unions in establishing 
“party machine” style campaigns.  Finally, he hails the party’s 
ability to control the campaign agenda by forcing other parties 
to consider controversial issues such as immigration, the pres-
ent state of French politics, and French suburban conditions 
and articulate stances on them.  In this manner, he implicitly 
warns that the Front National has established a model by which 
other parties of the extreme right might seize power across Eu-
rope.2
  Schain’s breakdown of the Front National’s success funda-
mentally agrees with Fetzer’s understanding of support bases 
for parties of the extreme right.  Fetzer argues that economic 
self-interest and cultural marginality are both significant affect-
ers to an individual’s decision to support the extreme right.  It 
is clear that working class support for the Front National stems 
directly from economic self-interest; while the party’s tradi-
tional right wing ultra-conservative support base represents the 
least culturally marginalized in France.  Those who are more 
culturally marginalized are proportionally less likely to vote for 
parties of the extreme right.  Therefore, it follows that those 
that are least marginalized are most likely to vote for the ex-
treme right.  In this manner, the Front National garners strength 
from both the economic self-interest of the working class, and 
by tapping their constituency’s least marginalized voters.6,2
  De Witte also models support bases for the extreme right; 
he takes a multi-disciplinary approach to contrasting strong 
support for the Vlaams Blok, a Belgian party of the extreme 
right, and weak support for the corresponding party in the 
Netherlands.9  He analyzes the political systems of each coun-
try, the comparative attitudes of each country’s citizens, and the 
agonistic effect both factors have on one another; he calls these 
three factors supply, demand and mobilization respectively.  He 
argues that 
...[s]upply, demand, and mobilization are the three ba-
sic elements of any theory of participation, regardless 
of whether it concerns voting for a party associated 
with a movement or taking part in a demonstration.9
He stipulates that in both countries, support for the extreme 
right is mainly based in the “demand”, or negative attitude to-
ward immigrants and to a lesser extent feelings of political dis-
satisfaction.  He concludes that greater proportional support for 
the Vlaams Blok in Belgium is principally due to more intense 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and therefore, attitudi-
nal factors are the most important affecters to support for the 
extreme right.9
  Although researchers have modeled voter support for the 
extreme right, and many have considered attitudinal variables 
in their arguments, the present work fails to analyze the effects 
of outright, expressed xenophobia on support for the extreme 
right in a quantitative, macro-level fashion.  By considering xe-
nophobia and its impact on voter support across Europe, we 
will shed light on much of the previous work considered here. 
In particular, we will refine the connections between attitudes, 
political realities and voter support for the extreme right, and 
will further define the concept of “attitude” in the scope of ex-
treme right support.
Theory: Xenophobia Causes Support for the Ex-
treme Right
  Our analysis hinges on the relative importance of economic 
and/or political variables as opposed to attitudinal variables in 
the minds of voters on polling day.  Although economic and/or 
political variables may be important, we hypothesize that at-
titudinal variables carry greater weight in the minds of voters; 
voters support parties of the extreme right mainly because these 
parties express outright opinions that are in line with voter at-
titudes. 
  The onset of post-material values in Europe has led to a 
steady dealignment in party identification across the continent. 
Because this dealignment has diminished the prominence of the 
political party in voter decisions, it has allowed smaller, more 
ideologically acute parties, such as parties of the extreme right, 
to gain in overall vote share.0  The dealignment has increased 
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the importance of party viewpoints on singular issues: voters 
today vote on independent issues more than ever before.0  To-
day’s voters are most likely to vote for the party that articulates 
their viewpoints on the issues most important to them.  It fol-
lows that as party viewpoints on singular issues have increased 
in importance, attitudinal factors affecting voter viewpoints on 
such issues have become superbly important because voters 
select parties that share their viewpoints on key issues.  There-
fore, attitudinal factors have become more important than indi-
vidual political and/or economic variables since post-material 
sentiments have pushed dealignment.0 
  Another important outcome of the dealignment is the abil-
ity of smaller parties to manipulate the electorate.  As Dalton 
states, “the lack of longstanding partisan loyalties may also 
make electorates more vulnerable to manipulation and dema-
gogic appeals.” 0 (p. 93)  Schain’s discussion of the Front 
National in France exemplifies the ability of smaller parties to 
manipulate the electorate; parties of the extreme right pressure 
their more mainstream counterparts by forcing them to articu-
late their stances on issues of immigration and multicultura-
lism thereby making these factors more salient in voter deci-
sion-making processes.
  Identifying the particular attitudinal factors that cause voter 
support for parties of the extreme right is another implicit ob-
jective of our analysis. We hypothesize that xenophobia is the 
most important attitude delineating support of the extreme right. 
To rationalize this hypothesis, one must consider the stances 
of the party family itself. Parties of the extreme right can be 
characterized as anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalism, Euro-
skeptic, populist or anti-establishment and extremely national-
istic.  Which predispositions on the part of a voter coinciding 
with these party stances most influence that voter to support 
an extreme right party?  To consider whether a disposition of 
xenophobia, Euroskepticism, anti-establishmentism/populism 
or nationalism is most salient in voter choice, one must ques-
tion where the policy stances of parties of the extreme right 
overlap with those of other, more mainstream party families. 
Logically, where party stances overlap, a voter is likely to have 
several parties to choose from, and is therefore less likely to 
vote for a party of the extreme right based solely that singular 
policy stance. It is those stances with fewest overlaps that must 
then correspond with attitudes that have the greatest effect on 
extreme right vote share.
  Nationalism and Euroskepticism are both characteristics 
shared with other party families; nationalism is an ideal to 
which the conservative party family holds, while Euroskepti-
cism is held by parties of the new left, communist parties, and, 
to an extent, the green party family.  By default, then, the most 
salient predispositions of voters for the extreme right are xe-
nophobia and anti-establishment/ populism because no other 
European party families adhere to these stances. 
  Although being anti-establishment/ populist is an important 
predisposition, it does not represent an attitude.  Such a dis-
position is largely a product of the political and/or economic 
climate in a given country and therefore variable based on a
Figure 1: The first line accounts for predispositions that could contribute 
to voter support for the extreme right. The circled dispositions are those 
that do not contribute to voter support for other parties and therefore are 
most salient in voter support for the extreme right.
Table 1: Extreme Right Vote Share and Xenophobia by Country.  Shows vote share of the Extreme Right, proportions of respondents answering “disturbed” by 
people of other races (question 7) and religions (question 8) as tabulated on “Eurobarometer 53”, and Average Xenophobic Index by country analyzed.
* Average xenophobic Index varies between 0 and 2; 0 indicates no xenophobia, 2 indicates complete xenophobia.
Country Voteshare(%) Proportion Disturbed by Other Nationalities




Belgium 3.7 0.27 0.26 0.5
Denmark 2.9 0.23 0.32 0.5
Germany 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3
Greece . 0.23 0.20 0.
Italy 6.3 0. 0.2 0.3
Netherlands 0 0.05 0.06 0.
Spain . 0.20 0.7 0.
France . 0.0 0.0 0.2
Portugal 0 0.2 0.0 0.2
United Kingdom 0 0.6 0.3 0.3
Sweden . 0.2 0.7 0.3
Austria 3.7 0. 0.2 0.3
Aggregate 6.9 0.20 0.20 0.3
St. Deviation 6.5 0.0 0.20 0.
Euroskepticism , Xenophobia, Anti-Establishment/Populism, Nationalism, 
New Left, Communist, Greens Conservatives
Extreme Right
Issue Overlap and Party Support
2
 country’s economic and/or political status quo.  Therefore, xe-
nophobia remains as the fundamental attitude delineating sup-
port for the extreme right (Figure ).
  In formulating our hypothesis we also consider De Witte’s 
supply and demand model of support for parties of the extreme 
right.  Comparing strong support for the Vlaams Blok in Bel-
gium and relatively weak support for the extreme right in the 
Netherlands, he argues that the quintessential factor behind 
support for parties of the extreme right is demand.
The demand-side of participation covers the griev-
ances, the perceptions of deprivation and injustice, the 
group identification and ideologies that spur people 
on to take part in the activities of an organized move-
ment.9 (p. 2) 
  He therefore argues that negative attitudes toward immi-
grants and not institutional variables of party strength and po-
tential for success are what drive individual voters to parties 
of the extreme right in Belgium and the Netherlands.  He con-
cludes that a proportionally more intense sentiment of distrust 
and disdain for immigrants is the causal variable accounting for 
increased support for the Vlaams Blok over its counterpart in 
the Netherlands.  De Witte illustrates that the attitudinal vari-
able of xenophobia on the part of the unitary voter is fundamen-
tally important to predicting vote share for the extreme right. 
Because xenophobia is here shown to be the most important 
micro-level affecter of vote share for the extreme right, it fol-
lows that this variable should prove most important in macro-
level analyses as well.
  Because we conclude that xenophobia is the attitude most 
salient in extreme right voter identity, and that attitudinal factors 
are most important in predicting voter choice, we hypothesize 
that as xenophobic sentiments within a population increase, 
support for parties of the extreme right within that population 
also increase.  This implies that European countries in which 
greater percentages of the population are xenophobic should 
garner greater electoral support for parties of the extreme right, 
and countries in which lower percentages of the population 
are xenophobic should garner lower electoral support for such 
parties.  Our theory has several important implications when 
considering the recent rise in support for parties of the extreme 
right.
Data
  We use linear regressions to analyze the relationship be-
tween xenophobic attitudes in European populations and sup-
port for the extreme right. Such a model is optimal because it 
allows for a uniformed analysis and is most suitable for hypoth-
esis testing.  Our analysis includes 2 Western European coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom (Table ).
  Information on xenophobic attitudes was obtained from 
“Eurobarometer 53”, a multi-question survey administered to 
2,27 respondents in the spring of 2000, which asks questions 
to measure respondents’ attitudes toward people of other na-
tionalities, races and religions.  For the purposes of our analy-
sis we created a xenophobic index for each respondent from the 
questions below:
  46. And do you find the presence of people of other na-
     tionalities disturbing?
  47. And do you find the presence of people of another 
     race disturbing?
  48. And do you find the presence of people of another re-
     ligion disturbing?
  
Table 2: Vote Share and Control Variables by Country. Vote share of the Extreme Right, immigration (percentage of foreign citizens), percent unemployed, an 
interaction term between immigration and percent unemployed, log of the average district magnitude and seats allocated at the upper tier by country.







Belgium 3.7 8.7 79.7 0.88 0 9.
Denmark 2.9 .7 2. 0.9 0 5.2
Germany 0.6 9.8 92.2 0 328 9.
Greece . 0 0 0.72 68 .2
Italy 6.3 2 23. 0 55 .7
Netherlands 0 2 28. 0.83 0 .2
Spain . 6.3 77.9 0 0 2.3
France . .3 7.2 2.8 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 .05 0 .5
United Kingdom 0 3.6 25.2 0 0 7
Sweden . 6 9.8 .03 39 8.3
Austria 3.7 9.2 3.96 .3 28 8
Aggregate 6.9 .7 37.7 0.7 5.8 9.6
St. Deviations 6.5 3.2 29.3 0.6 93. .2
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  Question 6 was omitted because it showed a negative 
correlation with the other two questions and because being 
disturbed by the presence of other nationalities in one’s own 
country is not necessarily a function of xenophobia, but nation-
alism.  Therefore, inclusion of question 6 might have skewed 
our index meant only to gauge xenophobia. Using the other two 
questions, answers of “disturbing” were converted to one and 
answers of “not disturbing” were converted to zero.   Respon-
dents answering “don’t know” for either question were omit-
ted.  To formulate the xenophobic index, the values recorded 
for both questions 7 and 8 for each respondent were added. 
Vote shares for parties of the extreme right in each country were 
obtained from national election results closest to the adminis-
tration date of “Eurobarometer 53” (Table 2).
  To assure that our data was unbiased, it was necessary to 
establish controls. Golder’s work described above provides an 
efficient basis for controlling our data with economic and/or 
political variables.  We therefore include variables that account 
for all three of Golder’s hypotheses in our analysis: we include 
an immigration variable (percent foreign citizens in each coun-
try) to address the Ideational hypothesis; two variables of elec-
toral permissiveness to address the Instrumental hypothesis 
(the log of the average district magnitude of each country and 
the number of seats allocated at the upper tier for each coun-
try); and an interaction variable between unemployment (EU-
ROSTAT standardized unemployment rate) and immigration to 
address the Materialist hypothesis.  Unemployment data was 
included in the regression to assure that no statistical errors 
were encountered in using the interaction variable. The data 
used for control variables was obtained from Golder.
  Because Golder’s controls each address economic and/or 
political factors, xenophobia can reasonably be deduced as the 
most salient attitudinal factor contributing to vote share for 
the extreme right.  Regressing the xenophobic index next to 
Golder’s variables will not only identify whether or not xeno-
phobic trends in voter support for parties of the extreme right 
are important, it will also allow for a quantitative assessment of 
the relative importance of attitudinal factors vis-à-vis economic 
and political factors in voter support for extreme right parties.
Results
  Micro-level Linear regression analysis shows xenophobia 
as a significant affecter to support for the extreme right in the 
Western European democracies we analyzed (p = 0.000). The 
data also supports immigration and unemployment (p = 0.000) 
as well as the log of the average district magnitude (p = 0.03) 
as affecters to support for the extreme right. Finally, the inter-
action term between immigration and unemployment, as well 
as the number of seats allocated at the upper tier both showed 
negative, yet significant coefficients (Table 3).
  Aggregate-level Pearson correlation coefficients show that 
all variables significantly correlate with the vote share of par-
ties of the extreme right. Immigration is strongest correlated 
with vote share (0.26). The number of seats allocated at the 
upper tier and unemployment both show negative significant 
correlations with vote share (Table ).
Discussion and Implications on Future Research
  The attitudinal variable xenophobia is in fact an affecter to 
voter support for the extreme right: as the tendency of xeno-
phobia within a European population increases, voter support 
for the extreme right in that population also increases, and as 
the tendency of xenophobia decreases, voter support decreases. 
In this manner, there is a causal relationship between xenopho-
bia in a population and voter support for parties of the extreme 
right. 
  Although xenophobia is an affecter to vote share for parties 
of the extreme right, it is not the strongest affecter, as we origi-
nally hypothesized.  The immigration control variable shows 
a higher beta coefficient in our analysis, and is therefore more 
important in determining support for the extreme right. This 
affirms Golder’s Ideational hypothesis, which maintains that as 
the proportion of immigrants living within a given population 
increases, support for parties of the extreme right increases re-
gardless of other factors. 
  Interestingly, our data is inconclusive concerning Golder’s 
Institutional hypothesis, which is found by the analyst to be sig-
nificant.  The hypothesis stipulates that more permissive elec-
toral systems favor parties of the extreme right.  We analyze 
both average district magnitude and the number of parliamen-
tary seats allocated at the upper tier as variables of permissive-
ness.  The affect of the log of the average district magnitude on 
vote share of the extreme right is significant and positive while 
upper tier seats shows a significant negative affect; although 
both measures of permissiveness are significant, one is a posi-
tive affecter and the other a negative affecter.  The discrepancy 
likely occurs because Golder’s analysis accommodates several 
years worth of data, whereas our analysis uses only one data 
point per variable per country in years closest to the year 2000 
in which the “Eurobarometer 53” survey was administered.,
  Immigration, the variable found to be the strongest affecter 
to extreme right vote share, is most often considered a political 
rather than an attitudinal variable because it describes a current 
Table 3: Regression Coefficients of Variables Analyzed in Micro-Level Anal-
ysis.  The dependant variable is the vote share of the extreme right.  Model  
shows regression with Xenophobic index only. Model 2 shows regression with 
all variables.  B coefficients are not standardized.  Standard deviation listed in 
parentheses.  N = 2,27  * indicates P = 0.03  ** indicates P = 0.000
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Xenophobic 
Index 0.68** (0.086) 0.526** (0.08)
Immigration ********* .75** (0.09)
Unemployment* 
Immigration ********* -0.067** (0.006)
Log(Avg. Dis-
trict Magnitude) ********* 0.256* (0.2)
Upper Tier Seats ********* -0.002** (0.00)
Unemployment 
Rate ********* 0.255** (0.027)
CONSTANT 6.320** (0.063) .58** (0.289)
R2 0.005 0.2
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condition of the population in question. In the classic concep-
tion of the variable, it acts through economic means by stressing 
the low-skilled job market, and therefore pushing low-skilled 
labor to vote for extreme right parties.2  The fact that immi-
gration is a stronger affecter to extreme right vote share than 
xenophobia would seem to disprove the proposed theory that 
attitudinal variables are most important in determining voter 
support for parties of the extreme right.  However, although a 
political variable, immigration affects vote share in this context 
by means of an attitudinal pathway, as explained by the Allport-
Pettigrew hypothesis.8
  As discussed, the Allport-Pettigrew Contact hypothesis 
stipulates that contact can improve relationships between “in 
group” and “out group” when such contact is made in the con-
text of sharing in a particular effort, friendship, or other such 
cooperative circumstances.  However, when contact is casual, 
it tends to increase xenophobia in natives and further isolate 
immigrants. 
  In general, Western European “out group” immigrants are 
relegated to specific boroughs of the largest cities, having little 
to no cooperative or friendly contact with “in group” natives; 
European natives perceive the presence of immigrants, but due 
to societal barriers, do not interact with these immigrants in a 
constructive manner.  Therefore, primarily casual contact leads 
to increased distrust and disdain for immigrants by natives.  It 
follows logically that immigration increases the effect of the 
contact phenomenon.  This attitudinal influence of immigration 
likely accounts for its large affect on support for parties of the 
extreme right.
  If immigration was to modulate extreme right vote share 
due to economic effects rather than through our proposed path-
way, then the effect of immigration on vote share should mul-
tiply in poor economic times.  Golder’s Materialist hypothesis 
addresses the question of immigration and its correlation with 
economic self-interest in voter motivations.  This hypothesis, 
which models immigration as a modifier to the effects of un-
employment on voter support for parties of the extreme right 
is rejected by both Golder’s analysis and our own.  Therefore, 
data indicate that immigration acting through economic self-in-
terest is at best a poor affecter to voter support for parties of the 
extreme right and that immigration should be considered an at-
titudinal variable modulating support for parties of the extreme 
right in Europe.
  Multivariate trend analysis is an important avenue for fu-
ture research.  While dealignment, increased immigration, and 
support for the extreme right have all corresponded, the mecha-
nisms connecting them are only hypothetical.  Researchers must 
continue to consider the institutional and attitudinal fall-out of 
the dealignment, as well as analyze the connection between im-
migration and support for parties of the extreme right.  It is 
likely that the answer to the perplexing rise in voter support for 
the extreme right lies in such analysis.  In identifying the role 
that each of these trends plays in propping the others, analysts 
of Europe can gain a greater understanding of the social and 
political forces at work.
  Another important consideration for future research is the 
mechanism by which xenophobia leads to increased support for 
parties of the extreme right.  Although we assume the relation
 
ship to be direct, there may in fact be a mediating variable be-
tween xenophobia and party support.  Future analysts should 
focus on the affect of xenophobia on other factors that might 
themselves lead to voter support for the extreme right. Such 
factors could act as intermediating variables between xenopho-
bia and voter support.
  Understanding the factors that compel voters to support 
parties with such intense standpoints on so many issues has 
extremely broad implications on the future of Europe’s politi-
cal climate.  By analyzing the affects of xenophobia on voter 
support for such parties, we have effectively identified its rela-
tive importance as a partial determinant to voter support for 
parties of the extreme right.  However, our work only clarifies 
one portion of a very murky enigma that will likely require the 
cooperation of multiple social scientific perspectives to com-
pletely understand. 
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Dr. Orit Kedar, professor of Political Science 
and instructor of Poli Sci 97 at UM: the article was inspired by 
a paper originally written for that course.
References
. M. Gallagher, M. Laver and P. Mair., Representative Go-
   vernment in Modern Europe; Institutions, Parties and  
   Governments (Mc-Graw Hill, New York, ed. , 2006).
2. M. S. Schain., “The National Front and the Legislative 
    Elections of 997” in How France Votes, M. S. Lewis-
    Beck, Ed. (Chatham House, New York, 2000), pp. 70-96.
3. W. Van der Brug, et al., European Journal of Political 
  Research . 2000, 37, 77-02.
. M. Golder, Comparative Political Studies. 2003, 37(4), 
    32-66.
5. P. Noris, Radical Right: voters and parties in the electoral
    market (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005).
6. J. S. Fetzer, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 
    2000, 26(1), 5-23.
7. J. S. Fetzer, “Recent Attitudes toward Immigration in Ger-
  many” and “Culture, Nationality, and the Future of Na-
  tivism,” in Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the 
  United States, France, and Germany, (Cambridge Univ-
Table 4: Aggregate-Level Pearson Correlations with Vote Share by Variable. 






Log(Avg. District Magnitude) 0.23**





  ersity Press, Cambridge, 2000), pp.23-5.
8. G. W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Doubleday, Gar-
    den City, NY, 95).
9. H. De Witte, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 
    200, 26(4), 699-77.
0. R. J. Dalton, “Citizen Politics; Public Opinion and Polit-
    ical Parties” in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Cha-
       tham House Publishers, Seven Bridges Press, New York, 
    ed. 3, 2002).
. H. Hartung., “Eurobarometer 53: Racism, Information 
    Society, General Services, and Food Labeling,” (In-
    ter-university Consortium for Political and Social Re-
    search, 2000).
